Constitutional Features & Amendments
GS Paper: GS Paper II | Subject: Polity | Last updated: 2026-07-20
Prelims
(Key facts, data, schemes, laws, organizations — MCQ-ready points)
Delimitation — The 131st Amendment & the Constitutional Freeze (The Hindu News Analysis, 20-07-2026)
- What the Centre moved in April 2026: the Constitution (131st Amendment) Bill, 2026 + the Delimitation Bill, 2026, which in combination proposed to:
- Increase Lok Sabha strength to a maximum of 850 seats
- Allot those seats among States on the "latest Census" figures (which is the 2011 Census) and delimit constituencies within each State immediately — whereas the Constitution as it stands permits a fresh allocation and delimitation only after the Census of 2027
- Reserve one-third of Lok Sabha seats for women — which would otherwise take effect only with the fresh delimitation after the 2027 Census
- The outcome: the Constitution (131st Amendment) Bill was DEFEATED in the Lok Sabha on 17 April 2026 — of 528 members present and voting, 298 voted in favour, short of the required two-thirds majority. The Delimitation Bill was not put to vote
- The three Censuses referenced in Articles 81 and 82 — the single most examinable fact here:
| Reference in Art. 81/82 |
What it governs |
| The first Census after 2026 |
When the next delimitation may occur (the sunset on the current freeze) |
| The Census of 1971 |
The existing proportion of Lok Sabha seats among States |
| The Census of 2001 |
The population of individual constituencies within a State |
- The two freezes: the seat-allocation freeze has been imposed twice, for 25 years each — in 1976 until 2001 (42nd Amendment) and in 2001 until 2026 (84th Amendment). The existing arrangement ends automatically once data of the first Census after 2026 is published — a sunset clause, not a permanent guarantee
- Why the Bills were defeated — the text/promise gap: the government publicly maintained that delimitation would not affect any State's existing proportion in the Lok Sabha, and that a 50% increase in House size would mean a 50% increase in each State's seats. But the April Bills removed all three Census references and tied both allocation and delimitation to the "latest Census" — which does not preserve State proportions. Because the text conflicted with the oral assurance, no consensus formed and the amendment failed
- What the Centre must now do (the analysis's technical prescription): to write the promise into the text it must extend the freeze — amend the "first Census after 2026" references in Articles 81 and 82 to read, e.g., "after 2051" (another 25 years). To guarantee each State a proportionate 50% increase, the 1971 Census reference must be retained. And to permit a fresh intra-State delimitation while preserving inter-State proportions, the 2001 Census reference can be amended to 2011 — this combination extends the federal guarantee while still redrawing constituency boundaries within States and triggering women's reservation
- Article 81(2)(a) is the specific provision that embeds the State-wise proportionality guarantee — Jairam Ramesh argues talk of a proportionate 50% increase is "meaningless in the light of Article 81(2)(a)" once that protection is removed
- Political positions (20-07-2026): the Congress favours extending the freeze by another 25 years. Jairam Ramesh notes the DMK played a pivotal role in the 1976 freeze, and the DMK and TDP in the 2001 freeze, urging both to "not fritter away their legacy". The TDP — a key BJP ally — has advocated retaining the 1971 reference. The DMK favours implementing 33% women's reservation within the existing Lok Sabha strength and says delimitation must not adversely affect southern States
- Why the issue has revived: the government's Lok Sabha strength rose after splits in the Trinamool Congress and Shiv Sena (UBT) — potentially putting a two-thirds majority within reach (see the anti-defection entry in parliament-legislature)
- The Madhya Pradesh Cabinet approved a draft UCC Bill on 19 July 2026, drafted by a six-member committee, to be tabled in the Assembly's Monsoon Session
- Key provisions: prohibits polygamy across all communities; declares triple talaq and nikah halala illegal and punishable; declares verbal divorce and decisions by informal panchayats completely illegal (a marriage may be dissolved only on statutory grounds); makes registration of marriages and divorces mandatory for all communities via government portals
- On legitimacy of children: the Code removes the term "illegitimate" from the legal framework — children of married or unmarried parents, whether biological, adopted, or born through surrogacy or Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), will enjoy equal legal status
- Live-in relationships: couples must submit an affidavit to the local registrar within one month of entering the relationship, failing which legal action may follow. Minimum age remains 18, but if either partner is below 21, information on the commencement and termination of the relationship goes to their parents or guardians, and the registrar shares the record with the local police. Children born of live-in relationships are legitimate with full inheritance rights; an abandoned woman partner may claim maintenance through a competent court, "just like a legal wife"
- The tribal exemption — constitutionally the most important point: the Bill does not apply to Scheduled Tribes (Bhil, Gond, Korku, Baiga, Sahariya, Bharia named) covered under Article 342 and Article 366(25), to protect their "unique cultural heritage and traditional lifestyle"; communities whose traditional rights are protected under Part XXI of the Constitution are also specifically exempted
- Context: CM Mohan Yadav claimed support from all religious communities, asserting over 80% of Muslim women and 40% of Muslim men backed the proposal (a political claim, not survey data — do not cite as fact). Follows Uttarakhand, the first State to enact a UCC (2024, in force January 2025), which used a similar ST exemption and a similar live-in registration regime
Mains
(Analysis, dimensions, significance, critique, policy angles — for 10/15 mark answers)
Delimitation — Representation vs Federalism (The Hindu, 20-07-2026)
- The core constitutional dilemma: delimitation forces a choice between two legitimate democratic principles. "One person, one vote, one value" demands that seats track population — currently violated, since a Kerala MP represents far fewer people than a UP MP. But federal fairness demands that States which successfully implemented family planning are not punished with reduced national influence. The freeze since 1976 has privileged the second principle for 50 years
- The trust deficit is the operative problem: the analysis's sharpest point is that the failure in April was not ideological but textual — the government's oral assurances on the floor of Parliament did not match the Bills it circulated. In constitutional amendment, assurances are not enforceable; text is. The Opposition's demand is simply that the promise be written into Articles 81 and 82. A clean illustration of why constitutional guarantees must be textual, not political
- Why the "proportionate 50% increase" formula is contested: raising every State's seats by 50% preserves relative shares but freezes malapportionment in absolute terms — the vote-value gap between a Kerala and a UP voter would persist, merely at a larger House size. It resolves the federal objection while leaving the equality-of-vote objection untouched — worth stating explicitly for a balanced answer
- The women's-reservation entanglement: one-third reservation has been legislatively tied to delimitation, so a federal dispute now delays a gender-justice measure. The DMK's proposal — implement 33% within the existing strength — would de-link the two. A strong "way forward" point (see women-empowerment)
- Balanced way forward: (a) extend the freeze on inter-State allocation (to 2051) while permitting intra-State redrawing on the 2011 Census, which fixes the worst within-State distortions without a federal rupture; (b) de-link and implement women's reservation immediately; (c) compensate southern States through Finance Commission devolution and Rajya Sabha weightage rather than Lok Sabha seats; (d) build political consensus first — a two-thirds amendment cannot be won by surprise
- UPSC angle: Articles 81, 82, 170; delimitation & the 42nd/84th Amendments; federalism & the "North–South divide"; equality of vote value; women's reservation (106th Amendment); Finance Commission devolution as a federal balancing tool; constitutional amendment procedure (Art. 368) & special majority
- The central tension: a Uniform Civil Code that exempts Scheduled Tribes is, by definition, not uniform. Both Uttarakhand and now Madhya Pradesh have carved out this exemption — which concedes the deeper principle that legal pluralism can be constitutionally legitimate where a community's distinct identity is at stake. The obvious question follows: if tribal customary law deserves protection under Articles 342/366(25) and Part XXI, on what principle is religious personal law denied the same deference? This is the strongest analytical hook in any UCC answer
- The case for the exemption: tribal customs are protected by a distinct constitutional scheme — the Fifth and Sixth Schedules, Article 244, PESA, and the Part XXI special provisions (e.g. Articles 371A/371G protecting Naga and Mizo customary law on ownership, inheritance and social practices). A State UCC cannot override these without constitutional conflict. So the exemption is legally compelled, not merely political
- The case for the reforms themselves: the substantive provisions advance gender justice — abolishing polygamy and nikah halala, ending extra-judicial verbal divorce and informal-panchayat decrees, mandatory registration (which protects maintenance, alimony and inheritance claims), and abolishing the category of "illegitimate" children (including ART and surrogacy births). Article 44 is a Directive Principle; Sarla Mudgal (1995) and Shayara Bano (2017) are the judicial markers
- The strongest criticisms to state fairly: (a) live-in registration with police intimation and parental notification for under-21s raises serious privacy and autonomy concerns after K.S. Puttaswamy (2017) — it arguably surveils a lawful private relationship; (b) personal law is in the Concurrent List (Entry 5, List III), so State-by-State codes risk a patchwork of "uniform" codes that is the opposite of uniformity, with inter-State conflict-of-laws problems; (c) reform imposed without genuine community consultation can be experienced as majoritarian, hardening the very identities it seeks to transcend — the 21st Law Commission (2018) concluded a UCC was "neither necessary nor desirable at this stage", recommending instead the reform of discriminatory practices within each personal law
- UPSC angle: Article 44 & Directive Principles, personal law vs fundamental rights (Arts. 14, 15, 21, 25), tribal customary law & Articles 342/366(25)/371A/371G/Part XXI, Concurrent List Entry 5, Puttaswamy & privacy, Shayara Bano/Sarla Mudgal, 21st Law Commission consultation paper, Uttarakhand UCC as precedent (see also scheduled-tribal-areas)