Bilateral, Regional & Global Groupings

GS Paper: GS Paper II | Subject: International Relations | Last updated: 2026-07-20

---

Prelims

(Key facts, data, schemes, laws, organizations — MCQ-ready points)

UK Foreign Secretary's India Visit & UK–India FTA (Indian Express, 04-06-2026)

• UK Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper on her first official India visit; to meet PM Modi and EAM S. Jaishankar
• Context: India & UK concluded a Free Trade Agreement (CETA — Comprehensive Economic & Trade Agreement); both sides pushing to bring it into force soon (UK Business & Trade Secretary Peter Kyle visited earlier in the week)
• Formal review of delivery under the UK–India "Vision 2030" roadmap — covering trade, technology, defence & security, climate, education
• Pillar named: Technology Security Initiative (TSI)

India–UK CETA to Take Effect 15 July 2026 (The Hindu, 21-06-2026)

• The India–UK Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), signed July 2025, will be implemented from 15 July 2026; covers tariffs, mobility and services
• No investment chapter — unlike India's deals with New Zealand and the EFTA bloc; UK trade expert Anton Muscatelli (President, Royal Society of Edinburgh) argues this is not a concern because higher trade + ease-of-doing-business will "create an enabling framework" for FDI anyway. (Contrast: the European Commission's von der Leyen and EU envoy Hervé Delphin say the EU–India deal also lacks an investment chapter and a separate investment treaty should be worked on quickly.)*
• Mutual gains cited: UK gets entry into India's financial-services sector; India gets entry into the UK's IT-services market. FDI into India is now mostly on the automatic route; remaining investor concerns = tax compliance, land acquisition, dispute resolution, last-mile connectivity

Venezuela VP's 5-Day India Visit (Indian Express, 04-06-2026)

• Venezuelan Vice-President Delcy Rodríguez on a 5-day visit; to hold talks with PM Modi
• Focus areas: energy, trade & investment, pharmaceuticals, technology

India–South Korea Shipbuilding Partnership (The Hindu, 26-06-2026)

• South Korean President Lee Jae Myung's India visit (April 2026) — the first by a Korean leader in 8 years — gave momentum to a shipbuilding partnership in a sector India is trying to revive. South Korea's "big three" are entering India:
• Hyundai (HD Korea Shipbuilding) subsidiary signed with Cochin Shipyard Ltd and plans a $4 bn green shipyard at Thoothukudi (TN)
• Samsung Heavy Industries (SHI) partnered Swan Defence & Heavy Industries to build ships in India
• Hanwha Ocean has announced India interest; the Korea Marine Equipment Association (KOMEA) (304 firms) opened a Mumbai office to seed an ancillary ecosystem
• India's maritime targets: Maritime India Vision 2030 (top-10 shipbuilding nation by 2030) and Maritime Amrit Kaal Vision 2047 (top-5 by 2047); supporting instruments = Maritime Development Fund, Shipbuilding Development Scheme, Shipbuilding Financial Assistance Policy, and the new Sagarmala Finance Corporation Ltd (SFCL) — India's first NBFC for the maritime sector. Model inspiration: South Korea's Ulsan cluster (it went from minor player to global leader in ~15 years from the 1970s)

UK PM Keir Starmer Resigns (The Hindu, 26-06-2026)

• UK PM Sir Keir Starmer announced his resignation on 22 June 2026 — a leadership change in a key partner just as the India–UK CETA is due to take effect 15 July 2026 (signed July 2025). A reminder that FTA operationalisation can be buffeted by partner-country politics (cf. the deal was "signed but not yet operationalised" through 2025–26)

India–UK CETA & Social Security Pact ENTER INTO FORCE (PIB / The Hindu, 15-07-2026)

• CETA is now operational from 15 July 2026 (concluded 6 May 2025 after 14 rounds; signed 24 July 2025 in London by Piyush Goyal and UK Business & Trade Secretary Jonathan Reynolds). 30 chapters, going well beyond tariffs into services, innovation, digital trade, public procurement, IPR, labour, environment and gender
• Goods: India secured immediate duty-free access on 99% of tariff lines; the UK got immediate duty elimination on 96.8% of India's tariff lines (97.7% of UK trade value). UK duties removed: processed foods up to 70%, marine 21.5%, engineering goods & auto components 18%, leather & footwear 16%, textiles & clothing 12%, chemicals & pharma 8%
• Scotch whisky: India's tariff falls 150% → 75% immediately, then to 40% by year 10. Autos: UK concessions for Indian electric, hybrid and hydrogen passenger cars — duty-free within an annual quota
• Services / Mode 4: commitments across all 12 major service sectors and 137 sub-sectors, covering >99% of India's services export interest (IT/ITeS, financial, professional — consultancy/architecture/engineering, education). No Economic Needs Test (ENT) and no numerical restrictions on professionals travelling to the UK
• Double Contribution Convention (DCC), signed 10 February 2026, in force the same day — ends dual social-security contributions for Indian professionals posted to the UK for up to 5 years, cutting employment cost and raising take-home pay
• Bilateral trade ~US$56 bn, targeted at US$100–120 bn by 2030

India–New Zealand FTA Signed — Dairy Excluded (PIB / NZ MFAT, 27-04-2026)

• Signed 27 April 2026; negotiations launched March 2025 and concluded in ~9 months — New Zealand's fastest-ever FTA
• NZ exporters get tariffs removed/reduced on ~95% of current exports (sheep meat, wool, forestry, seafood, honey, wine, apples, kiwifruit) — but India excluded dairy and certain agricultural products almost entirely, protecting domestic farmers (the same red line that drove India out of RCEP)
• Not yet in force as of July 2026 — NZ enabling-bill submissions closed 19 July 2026; ratification targeted later in 2026

India–EFTA TEPA in Force — First Binding Investment Pledge in an Indian FTA (EFTA / PIB, 01-10-2025)

• Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA) with EFTA — Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein — signed 10 March 2024, in force 1 October 2025; India's first FTA with a bloc of four developed European nations
• Article 7.1: EFTA commits US$100 billion in FDI and 1 million direct jobs over 15 years — US$50 bn in the first 10 years, US$50 bn in the next 5. This is the first legally-framed investment commitment in any Indian trade agreement
• Market access: EFTA opened 92.2% of its tariff lines (covering 99.6% of India's exports); India opened 82.7% (covering 95.3% of EFTA's exports), protecting dairy, soya, coal and sensitive agriculture

AITIGA Review & the "B-team of China" Remark (Indian Express / BW, 2025-26)

• Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal called the 2010 ASEAN–India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) "silly" and said some ASEAN members had become a "B-team of China" (India Global Forum, London) — arguing it exposed India to indirect Chinese imports through lax rules of origin
• India's ASEAN trade deficit widened from US$4.98 bn (2010-11) to US$44.20 bn (2024-25)
• The ASEAN co-chair of the AITIGA review formally conveyed displeasure over the tone and timing at the Kuala Lumpur review meeting; the AITIGA review remains the live negotiation

India–US Bilateral Trade Agreement — Still Unsigned (Bloomberg / Business Standard, July 2026)

• First-phase India–US BTA parked at the "last 1%" of legal text — no signed pact, no published document — as the interim US tariff arrangement counts down to its 24 July 2026 expiry
• US to lower the Reciprocal Tariff on India from 25% to 18%; the additional 25% tariff tied to Russian-oil purchases removed in recognition of India's commitment to stop buying it
• Key sticking point: tariff competitiveness — India wants terms better than its ASEAN peers get, a live case of third-country competition. Modi and Trump directed officials at the June G-7 pull-aside to fast-track it

Timor-Leste Becomes ASEAN's 11th Member (ASEAN Secretariat, 26-10-2025)

• Admitted at the 47th ASEAN Summit, Kuala Lumpur — ASEAN's first expansion since Cambodia in 1999. Applied 2011; agreed in principle with observer status 2022; roadmap adopted 2023
• ASEAN is now 11 members — but note that RCEP negotiations (2012–19) involved ASEAN-10 + 6, i.e. 16 countries

WTO Regional Trade Agreements — the Count (WTO RTA Database, 17-07-2026)

• 386 RTAs notified and in force — 350 under GATT Article XXIV, 221 under GATS Article V, 65 under the Enabling Clause; plus at least 79 more in force but not yet notified to the WTO (as of June 2026)
• India: 15 FTAs covering 27 nations (GTRI, June 2026)

---

Mains

(Analysis, dimensions, significance, critique, policy angles — for 10/15 mark answers)

Building a Shipbuilding Powerhouse with Korean Help (The Hindu, 26-06-2026)

• Why shipbuilding is strategic: it is capital-, labour- and technology-intensive, anchors a vast ancillary ecosystem, earns export revenue, and underpins maritime/defence self-reliance and the blue economy — but India is a minor player dominated by China, South Korea and Japan
• The Korean model & its transfer: Korea's cluster-led rise (Ulsan) offers a template; the MoUs bring design/engineering expertise, production know-how, workforce development and ancillary localisation that India lacks. Success needs sustained policy + fiscal support, low-cost long-term capital (SFCL), regulatory predictability, and academia–industry linkages — and State + Centre coordination to clear approval bottlenecks (the TN greenfield project)
• De-risking caution: the sector remains exposed to external shocks (supply chains, demand cycles) and must compete with a heavily-subsidised China — so it needs "hand-holding until self-sufficient"
• UPSC angle: India–South Korea relations, shipbuilding & blue economy, Maritime Vision 2030/2047 & Sagarmala, cluster-led industrialisation, technology transfer & Make-in-India (see [infrastructure-investment])

Trade & Tech Diplomacy with the West (Indian Express, 04-06-2026)

• UK–India CETA significance: A flagship FTA with a G7 economy — market access for Indian goods/services + a template as India negotiates with the EU and (interim) US; the Vision 2030 annual review institutionalises follow-through beyond signing
• Beyond trade: The Technology Security Initiative signals partnerships are now built around critical & emerging tech, defence and supply-chain security, not just tariffs — India diversifying tech ties away from single-source dependence
• Venezuela = energy & autonomy: Engaging an OPEC oil producer despite Western sanctions reflects India's strategic-autonomy, diversified-energy-sourcing approach (cf. discounted Russian oil)
• UPSC angle: India–UK FTA/CETA, strategic partnerships, technology security, India's multi-alignment, energy diplomacy & strategic autonomy

India's FTA Paradox — Signing Spree, Low Utilisation, Widening Deficits (GTRI report, June 2026)

• The paradox: India now has 15 FTAs covering 27 nations and is negotiating more (US, EU, others) — yet Indian exporters use only 20–30% of available preferences, against 60–70% utilisation by partner-country exporters using the same agreements, and 70–80% in many developed economies. The India–Australia ECTA is the outlier at ~84%; India's older Asian FTAs run at 50–60%
• Why utilisation stays low: limited MSME awareness, underdeveloped certification infrastructure, and complex rules-of-origin compliance whose fixed costs fall hardest on small firms
• Deficits widened with almost every partner: between 2007-09 and 2023-25, India's trade deficit rose 381% with ASEAN, 318% with Japan, 268% with South Korea. Over the five years to FY24 (GTRI, May 2024), exports to FTA partners grew ~14.5% (US$107.20 → 122.72 bn) while imports from them grew ~38% (to US$187.92 bn); FTA partners were 28% of India's total trade
• The structural charge: FTAs have aggravated India's inverted duty structure — duties on raw materials and inputs exceeding those on finished goods — making imports cheaper and incentivising firms to shift manufacturing to Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia
• Adverse margin of preference: because developed partners' tariffs are already near zero (Switzerland, New Zealand ~99% of goods duty-free for everyone) while India's simple average applied MFN tariff is 15.8% (WTO World Tariff Profiles 2025), India concedes far more tariff ground than it gains — and partners keep non-tariff measures out of the deal so the stick remains available
• UPSC angle: FTA utilisation & trade deficits, rules of origin & CAROTAR/§28DA, inverted duty structure, adverse margin of preference, third-country competition, trade agreements vs multilateralism (Bhagwati's spaghetti-bowl critique) (see industrial-policy-manufacturing and the class note on trade agreements)